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1 Introduction
The theory of optimal income taxation has reached maturity and excellent
reviews of the field are available (Mankiw et al. 2009, Salanie´ 2011, Piketty
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and Saez 2012). At the same time, insatisfaction appears to be growing about
the difficulty of the theory to solve problems that have recently been raised.
A first source of insatisfaction comes from the fact that most of the corpus
of optimal tax theory assumes that individuals have identical preferences. For
instance, Boadway lists the “heterogeneity of individual utility functions”
(2012, p. 30) as one of the big challenges for optimal tax theory (along issues
of government commitment, political economy, and behavioral phenomena).
“The assumption of identical utility functions is made more for analytical
simplicity than for realism. It also finesses one of the key issues in applied
normative analysis... which is how to make interpersonal comparisons of
welfare” (p. 30-31).
The issue of making interpersonal comparisons of welfare is indeed much
more than an issue of analytical simplicity. When individuals have the same
utility function, the only ethical question that has to be settled is the degree
of inequality aversion, over which it is not too difficult to perform a sensitivity
analysis spanning the various possible value judgments (from utilitarianism
to maximin). This is what optimal tax theory has done very well. In contrast,
when individual preferences differ, interpersonal comparisons involve much
more difficult questions, which, in philosophy (Rawls 1982) as well as in folk
justice (Gaertner and Schokkaert 2012), are generally addressed in terms of
fair allocation of resources or opportunities.
There comes the second source of insatisfaction. It concerns the gap be-
tween the normative underpinnings of the theory and the relevant fairness
values that seem important in income redistribution. For instance, Weinzierl
writes that “conventional theory neglects the diverse normative criteria with
which, as extensive evidence has shown, most people evaluate policy” (2012,
p. 1). Similarly, Piketty and Saez emphasize “the limitations of the stan-
dard utilitarian approach” and argue: “While many recent contributions use
general Pareto weights1 to avoid the strong assumptions of the standard util-
itarian approach, we feel that the Pareto weight approach is too general to
deliver practical policy prescriptions in most cases. Hence, we think that it is
important to make progress both on normative theories of justice stating how
social welfare weights should be set and on positive analysis of how individ-
ual views and beliefs about redistribution are formed.” (2012, p. 2) Sheffrin
1A (constrained or unconstrained) Pareto-efficient allocation is an extremum for a
weighted sum of utilities (and a maximum when the feasible utility set is convex). These
weights are called Pareto weights or, in some specific contexts, Negishi weights (Negishi
1972). [footnote added]
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(2013) also argues that folk notions of fairness are ignored in the economic
theory of taxation. Among the considerations that are missed by the classi-
cal approach, according to these authors, one finds the idea that tagging2 on
the basis of statistical discrimination may violate a form of horizontal equity;
the libertarian view that the distribution of earnings may deserve some re-
spect; the principle that income inequalities due to differences in preferences
are not as problematic as inequalities due to differences in qualifications or
social background.
The first objective of this paper is to review and discuss the difficulties
of classical optimal taxation theory, especially in its attempts to take prefer-
ence heterogeneity into account. Although its limitations are now quite well
known, it is worth carefully listing them and have them in the background for
the examination of other frameworks. There is a temptation in the literature
to throw the baby with the bath water, and our main message is that the
classical framework should be extended rather than abandoned.
The second objective of the paper is to review some recent contributions
that have invoked fairness principles to derive conclusions about income taxa-
tion. We discuss the extent to which such contributions solve the difficulties
faced by classical optimal taxation theory. Along the way, we attempt to
1) clarify some possible misunderstanding about the compatibility between
fairness principles and the Pareto principle; 2) provide intuitive explanations
for notions that the literature often derives from axiomatic analysis; and 3)
explain why one finds the maximin aggregator in several fairness approaches.
Our discussion will lead us to argue that fairness concepts can help solve
difficulties of the classical approach to optimal income taxation theory not
by overruling the classical social welfare functions, but by providing useful
selections of such functions and in particular of suitable individual utility
indexes. In particular, there is a way to construct utility functions embedding
ethical principles for which the various sources of income inequalities do not
equally call for redistribution.
In this paper we also review contributions that try to refine classical op-
timal tax theory by only amending the aggregator, introducing weights into
the utilitarian social objective. This approach offers an alternative way to
introduce fairness principles in optimal taxation. Compared to construct-
2Tagging (Akerlof 1978) makes the tax paid by an agent depend on a characteristic
that is ethically irrelevant but statistically correlated to some ethically relevant variable,
such as the agent’s skill.
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ing suitable utility functions, however, introducing weights turns out to be
less tractable and delivers recommendations that are only consistent with a
narrower set of fairness principles.
Our paper is complementary to a recent paper by Saez and Stantcheva
(2013). They propose to go beyond the classical social welfare function frame-
work and to derive optimal taxes from the application of marginal social
welfare weights directly to earning levels. The weights at each earning level
depend on the characteristics of the agents earning that much, and can be in-
spired by fairness principles. In this fashion, Saez and Stantcheva are able to
retrieve and extend some of the fair tax results. Compared to their approach,
our contribution is to show that many relevant fairness considerations can ac-
tually be accommodated in the classical social welfare framework. Moreover,
as they note, determining the weights to be applied to earnings is not always
immediate from the reading of fairness principles and may require a detour
which involves writing down the social welfare function. In a nutshell, we
propose to broaden the considerations that shape the social welfare function
rather than abandon the social welfare framework itself. But with them and
the authors quoted in the beginning of this introduction we share the general
goal of incorporating a broader set of ethical principles in optimal tax theory,
and their analysis in terms of weights on earnings is definitely useful, as we
will illustrate in this paper.
In the following sections, we begin with a brief description of the main
achievements of the classical approach (section 2). We then discuss the diffi-
culties associated with utilities as a proxy for well-being (section 3) and with
utilitarianism as an aggregator of well-being levels (section 4). We review
various fairness approaches to optimal taxation in section 5: Mankiw’s “just
deserts” approach, Roemer’s equality of opportunity, the fair social ordering
approach, and the luck-desert distinction discussed in Saez and Stantcheva
(2013). In that section we also briefly discuss Kaplow and Shavell’s (2001)
challenge to fairness principles. In the following section, we discuss various
attempts to incorporate fairness principles in a weighted utilitarian social
welfare function (section 6). Next, we analyse the derivation of fair optimal
tax and the usefulness of Saez and Stantcheva’s (2013) approach in terms
of marginal social welfare weights (section 7). Finally, we provide a sim-
ple methodology for linking the construction of utility functions with four
connected but distinct ethical choices: subjective utility versus fairness, re-
distribution versus laissez-faire, compensation versus responsibility, and the
relative treatment of individuals with different preferences (section 8). This
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methodology is meant to be applicable by practitioners who want to be in
control of the ethical underpinnings of their choices of utility functions with-
out having to go through arcane axiomatics. We conclude in section 9.
2 Achievements of the classical approach
Optimal taxation theory studies how to design tax systems that maximize
social welfare. Let us begin by defining the main ingredients of the theory
formally. There are two goods, labor and consumption, and n agents. A
bundle for individual i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} is a pair zi = (`i, ci), where `i is
labor and ci consumption. The agents’ consumption set X is defined by the
conditions 0 ≤ `i ≤ 1 and ci ≥ 0. The restriction of labor to an interval is not
always made in the tax literature but it will play a role in our own analysis.
The individuals have two characteristics, their personal utility function
over the consumption set and their personal productivity. For every agent
i ∈ N, the utility function Ui : X → R represents preferences over labor and
consumption. We assume that individual utility functions are continuous,
quasi-concave, non-increasing in `, and increasing in c.
The marginal productivity of labor is assumed to be fixed, as with a
constant returns to scale technology. Agent i’s earning ability is measured by
her productivity or wage rate, denoted wi, and is measured in consumption
units, so that wi ≥ 0 is agent i’s production when working `i = 1, and
yi = wi`i denotes the agent’s pre-tax income (earnings).
An allocation is a collection of bundles z = (z1, ..., zn). A tax function
T : R+ → R delineates the budget constraint c = y − T (y), which, in terms
of labor and consumption, reads c ≤ wi`− T (wi`) for all individuals i ∈ N .
An allocation is incentive compatible if every agent maximizes his utility in
his budget set, or equivalently, if the self-selection constraint is satisfied: for
all i, j ∈ N,
Ui (`i, ci) ≥ Ui (yj/wi, cj) or yj > wi.
An allocation is feasible if
∑
i T (yi) ≥ G, where G is an exogenous require-
ment of government expenditures, or equivalently,
∑
i ci ≤
∑
i yi −G.
The problem of optimal taxation is to evaluate tax functions and seek
the best one under the feasibility constraint. Since Mirrlees (1971), the
evaluation of T is derived from an evaluation of the allocation(s) z that
T generates when every individual makes his choice in his personal bud-
get determined by wi and T . The evaluation of allocations has to be made
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with a social ordering function which, for every particular population profile
((U1, ..., Un) , (w1, ..., wn)), defines a specific ordering (i.e., a complete transi-
tive relation) on the set of allocations Xn. We retain this approach in all the
paper.
The classical theory of labor income taxation has been initially devel-
oped under two main assumptions. First, agents in the economy have dif-
ferent productivity levels, but they all have the same preferences over labor-
consumption bundles, represented by a single utility function: for all i ∈
N : Ui = U0. Second, the social planner is utilitarian, which means that the
social ordering function is defined as maximizing the sum of utility levels:∑
i
U0 (zi) . (1)
A more general social welfare function has also been considered, but under
separability assumptions this is just equivalent to considering various non-
linear rescalings of U0.
The questions that have been addressed in the optimal tax literature deal
with the first best implications of social welfare maximization, the design of
second-best tax schemes, and the social welfare evaluation of tax reforms.
The literature has in particular focused on deriving different formulas for
the optimal tax rates in the second-best context. These formulas show how
marginal tax rates depend on the elasticity of labor supply, the distribution
of productivity levels and the shape of the U0 function (which determines the
social marginal value of consumption that the social planner assigns to the
different types of agents).
In the last fifteen years, the theory has been enlarged to consider the more
realistic case in which agents also differ in their preferences. Introducing ad-
ditional dimensions of heterogeneity in the picture makes it considerably
more difficult to derive formulas for the optimal tax rates. First, the objec-
tive of the planner is much more difficult to define, as it requires to compare
agents with the same productivity but different preferences. Second, the tax-
ation of each income interval influences high-productivity-high-aversion-to-
work agents and low-productivity-low-aversion-to-work agents. Determining
how much to tax such an interval of incomes is more difficult than when all
agents have the same preferences, because in the latter case richer agents
also have higher productivity.
Solutions have been found for particular cases (see, e. g. Boadway, Marc-
hand, Pestieau and Racionero 2002, Jacquet and Van de Gaer 2011, Chone´
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and Laroque 2012). A general solution has also been proposed by Saez (2001,
2002), recently refined and extended in Jacquet and Lehmann (2014). Saez’s
approach consists in modifying the way the objective of the planner is de-
fined. It is no longer a function of agents’ utilities, but a function of agents’
incomes. All agents earning the same income, whatever their productivity,
receive the same weight, and the objective of the planner is defined in terms
of the relative weights that are assigned to sets of people earning different
incomes. More details about this approach are provided in section 7.
The income weight approach offers a valuable solution to the technical
difficulties of optimal tax theory in the presence of heterogenous preferences.3
Nonetheless, the question of how to make interpersonal utility comparisons,
and, more specifically, how to compare high-productivity-low-willingness-to-
work agents and low-productivity-high-willingness-to-work agents remains
complex. This is where fairness considerations can help, as recently advo-
cated by many authors. To prepare the background for such developments,
in the next section we go back to the fundamental question of the meaning
of utility and its use in optimal tax theory.
3 What are utilities?
The objective of optimal taxation theory is to go beyond the Pareto principle
and select among second best allocations the ones that are better justified
from a normative point of view. This requires social evaluation criteria that
involve cardinality and/or comparability judgments about individual well-
being. Such judgments are embedded in the utilities that enter the compu-
tation of social welfare.
There are two main views on utilities. According to the first view, utilities
are empirical objects that only need to be measured and can be used as the
inputs of a social welfare function, the only ethical issue being the degree of
inequality aversion in the function. According to the second view, utilities
3However, it is primarily a “first-order” approach that does not deal with bunching.
Multidimensional heterogeneity is addressed in Saez’s (2001) main text but not in the
formal proof of the tax formula. A full formal proof is provided by Jacquet and Lehmann
(2014) for separable utility functions and assuming smooth allocations with no bunching
(they adopt Wilson’s 1993 method of classifying the population into preference types,
with single-crossing being satisfied across skills within each type). In its full generality,
multidimensional screening remains largely an unsolved problem (Rochet and Stole 2003).
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themselves, not just the social welfare function, are normative indexes that
need to be constructed.
The first view has serious weaknesses. One can distinguish two main
approaches that adopt this view. In the first approach, utilities refer to
subjective self-assessments of well-being. This has been popularized in the
last two decades by the economics of happiness. It builds on answers to survey
question like “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days?
Would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy or not too happy?”.
There are many versions of this question. A variant relies on answers to
questionnaires that request the respondent to decompose their time into a
list of activities, and, for each of them, to list and evaluate the positive and
negative feelings associated to it.4
All these approaches are contemporary implementations of ideas that
have long been salient in philosophy and economics. Criticisms of these
approaches are also well known. The most important, in the context of this
paper, comes from political philosophy, and was raised by Dworkin (1981),
Rawls (1982) and Sen (1985). It says that subjective well-being is not a
legitimate argument of a theory of justice. One aspect of the criticism is the
“expensive taste” argument. If declaring a lower well-being level only reveals
a lower subjective disposition to transform consumption into satisfaction,
due to a higher level of aspiration, it does not call for compensation.
Another version of the argument involves adaptation. If declaring a high
well-being level only reveals one’s ability to adapt to objectively poor con-
ditions, it does not justify a policy failing to address these poor conditions.
Decancq et al. (2009) emphasize that subjective well-being data, by involv-
ing heterogenous aspiration levels, produce interpersonal comparisons that
may disagree with the comparisons made by the concerned individuals them-
selves: A highly ambitious high achiever may have a better situation than
someone else, as unanimously evaluated by these individuals, and yet have a
lower satisfaction level.5
Philosophers have suggested to replace utilities with other arguments.
Dworkin, in particular, clearly advocates taking the bundles of resources that
are assigned to agents as the appropriate argument of a theory of justice. As
4Among many references, see in particular Clark et al. (2008), Diener et al. (2010), Di
Tella and McCulloch (2006), Dolan and White (2007), Graham (2009), Kahneman et al.
(1999), Kahneman and Krueger (2006), Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008).
5A much more extensive discussion of the subjective well-being approach can be found
in Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013, chapter 5).
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we will see in section 5, some fairness approaches offer ways to implement an
ideal of equality of resources.
This rejection of utilities as an argument of a theory of justice by philoso-
phers seems to echo a similar rejection by people, when they are asked to as-
sess allocations. Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) have initiated a literature, based
on survey questionnaires, dedicated to understanding the ethical principles
that guide people’s view on just allocations. Summarizing that literature,
Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012) write that “the welfarist framework is not
sufficient to capture all the intuitions of the respondents.[...] Respondents
distinguish between needs and tastes and discount subjective beliefs to a
large extent. In general, intuitions about distributive justice seem to depend
on the context in which the problem is formulated” (p. 94-95). The same
authors also report the fact that “issues of responsibility and accountability,
of acquired rights and claims, of asymmetry between dividing harms and
benefits, are highly relevant to understand real-word opinions” (p. 137-138).
As we will see in section 5, these questions are at the heart of the fairness
approaches to optimal taxation. The fairness principles discussed later in
this paper receive a substantial support in the empirical literature surveyed
in Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012).
The second main approach that embraces the idea that utilities are em-
pirical objects that only need to be measured refers to choices under uncer-
tainty. It is well-known that rational preferences can be represented by von
Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions, and such utility functions
can be given a cardinal meaning, provided one assumes that risk aversion
is a direct translation of preference intensity. This is the assumption that
Vickrey (1945) suggested, and Harsanyi (1976) and Mirrlees (1982) endorsed
it as well.
There are two main criticisms against this family of theories. The first
criticism opposes the assumption that risk aversion is a measure of intensity
of preferences (Roemer 1996). This criticism rejects the view that vNM
utility functions can be given an ethically appealing cardinal interpretation.
Even if one accepts the cardinal interpretation, though, vNM utility func-
tions themselves do not provide the comparability that one needs to build a
social criterion, and this is especially relevant when one deals with heteroge-
nous preferences (which was not Mirrlees’ frame). There have been proposals
to calibrate the vNM functions, e.g., by letting all individual functions take
the same values (0 and 1) at particular points (Luce and Raiffa 1957, Dhillon
and Mertens 1993, Sprumont 2010, Adler 2014). But it is debatable whether
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this makes the interpersonal comparisons compelling. Like subjective well-
being data, they are vulnerable to the phenomenon that individuals with
identical ordinal preferences but different risk attitudes may be ranked by
the calibrated vNM functions against their own assessment of their relative
situations (even in riskless contexts).
Our conclusion on the literature on empirical measures of well-being is
not, however, that they should be rejected. There are authors who are not
convinced by the objections against such measures. Some are convinced he-
donists and believe that individuals who pursue other goals than happiness
are mistaken (Layard 2005, Dolan 2014). Some are more cautiously hoping
that these measures are good proxies of well-being and provide meaningful
interpersonal comparisons on average (Clark 2015). Our review of the criti-
cisms is meant to prove one point: Adopting such measures cannot be done
without relying on strong ethical assumptions. They are not neutral and
ready-to-use measures.6
Once one acknowledges that the choice of a particular utility measure is
always strongly value-laden, it is a small step to accept the second view and
treat utilities as normative constructs. This second view was defended in
particular by Atkinson (1995), and it is probably the dominant view among
optimal tax theorists. In the context of uniform preferences, Atkinson him-
self did not advocate relying on subjective well-being measures and instead
proposed to choose the least concave utility representation of the preferences
of the agents, and then to aggregate them with a more or less inequality
averse aggregator, reflecting the ethical preferences of the social planner.
Note that adopting a unique utility function when individuals have identi-
cal preferences guarantees that interpersonal comparisons will align with the
comparisons made by the individuals themselves —unlike subjective well-
being levels based on heterogenous aspiration levels.
Atkinson’s calibration is no longer applicable when agents have heteroge-
nous preferences. The least concave utility functions of the individuals are
then defined only up to a scaling factor, and are therefore not directly compa-
rable. Additional assumptions are needed to perform adequate interpersonal
comparisons.
One of the main ideas that we would like to defend in this paper is that
the second view offers valuable ways to accommodate interesting ethical prin-
ciples about equality and redistribution. The classical approach to optimal
6The same point was hammered in Robbins’ (1937) and Bergson’s (1938) classical texts.
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taxation has not explored how to construct utilities in this perspective. Fair-
ness approaches are meant to fill this gap, as we will illustrate in sections 5
and 8 below.
4 Utilitarianism and just outcomes
The social criterion that is classically used in optimal taxation theory is the
utilitarian social welfare function that adds up utilities. Independently of the
choice of utility functions that are used in this summation, we can list four
shortcomings of the utilitarian aggregator in the context of optimal income
taxation.
The first shortcoming was identified by Mirrlees (1974). He proved that in
a first best world, this social welfare function leads to the following surprising
result: if all agents have the same preferences, the high ability agents end up
enjoying lower satisfaction levels than the low ability ones. This is in sharp
contrast with what ethical intuition would recommend in that particular case.
One may, indeed, argue that differences in productive abilities do not justify
differences in outcomes. This calls for equalizing satisfaction levels among
agents with the same preferences. Another view holds that agents own their
ability at least partially, so that the high ability agents should reach a higher
satisfaction level. The utilitarian objective is unable to produce either result.
The second shortcoming was pointed out by Rawls (1971). Utilitarianism
is able to produce the undesirable outcome that a majority imposes an arbi-
trarily large loss to a minority. To put it differently, utilitarianism is unable
to guarantee a safety net to all agents, because an increase in utility of a well
off agent may offset a decrease in utility of a miserable agent, independently
of how low the utility of this agent is.
The third shortcoming is emphasized by Piketty and Saez (2012). Maxi-
mizing a sum of utilities, even weighted,7 cannot produce the desirable prop-
erties that 1) utility should be equalized when all agents have the same
preferences, an objective which we will refer to later as the compensation
objective,8 and 2) laissez-faire should prevail when all agents have the same
productivity level, an objective which we will refer to later as the laissez-
7This holds true unless the weights are endogeneized in a very complex way —see
section 6.
8The word compensation reflects the goal of eliminating the inequalities due to all other
causes than preferences.
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faire objective.9 By “laissez-faire”, we mean the imposition of a poll tax
T (y) = G/n on all individuals, which is equivalent to the absence of redis-
tribution.
The ethical goals of equalizing utilities among agents having the same
preferences and not redistributing among agents having the same produc-
tivity are, on the other hand, at the heart of several fairness approaches.10
In the next section, we illustrate several ways of combining these goals and
we show how they can be used to define social objectives that are ethically
grounded.
The fourth shortcoming is related to tagging. It is clear that tagging
represents an additional tool in the maximization of a social objective, be-
cause it uses relevant correlations between observed and unobserved indi-
vidual characteristics to better target redistribution. Tagging, though, has
been criticized on the ground that it leads to violations of the basic principle
of equal treatment of equals. Indeed, if two agents that are identical in all
dimensions that are ethically relevant but are different with respect to the
dimension along which people are tagged, they may be treated differently
and end up enjoying different satisfaction levels.
If the social criterion is utilitarian, the sum of the utilities will necessarily
increase, but at the cost of a gap in the utilities of agents who should be
considered equal. The shortcoming of utilitarianism in this respect is that
the gap between the utilities of these two agents can take place at the expense
of the worse off agent. That is, the agent with the unfavorable situation may
end up at a lower utility level than without tagging.
Let us assume, for instance, that skill is positively correlated to height.
Because height is observable, and because tall people should on average pay
more tax than small agents (as utilitarianism justifies redistributing from
richer to poorer agents), the optimal tax scheme would consist first in redis-
tributing a lump sum amount of money from the tall agents to the small ones,
and, second, in optimal second-best tax schemes among the small agents and
among the tall agents. It is clear that the small unskilled agents will bene-
9Jacquet and Van de Gaer (2011) prove a similar statement, restricting their attention
to two planner objectives, the non-weighted sum of utilities and the non-weighted sum of
a concave transformation of the utilities.
10In the literature, the former goal is often referred to as the compensation principle,
whereas the latter goal is referred to as the responsibility principle, or liberal reward
principle (see, e. g. Fleurbaey, 2008, and Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2011, for surveys of the
literature on these two principles).
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fit from the tagging. It is unlikely, though, that the tall unskilled ones will
benefit as well.
Let us note that this cannot happen if the criterion is strongly egalitarian,
such as a maximin criterion. As soon as the satisfaction of the social criterion
increases, by assumption, it cannot be obtained at the expense of the worse
off. Of course, tagging still leads under the maximin to violations of the
principle of equal treatment of equals, but the violations cannot happen
among the worse off agents. Concretely, the unskilled, whether small or tall,
need to end up enjoying the same increased satisfaction level.
More generally, the maximin criterion, applied to utilities, independently
of the way utilities are built, escapes three of the four shortcomings that we
just mentioned. As we will see in the next section, the maximin criterion plays
an important role in the fairness approach to optimal taxation, although it
is applied to well-being measures that are different from the ones that are
typically used in classical optimal taxation theory.
5 Fairness approaches to optimal taxation
In this section, we review the main fairness approaches to optimal taxation.
By fairness, we refer to approaches that impose ethical (typically egalitarian)
requirements on other objects than utilities. Before we begin this review,
though, we need to clarify the relationship between our notion of fairness
and the Pareto principle.
Kaplow and Shavell (2001) have argued that any continuous and non-
welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto principle. In their
work, welfarism is defined by the axiom of Pareto indifference: as soon as all
agents are indifferent between two allocations, society should also be indiffer-
ent between these two allocations. These authors were targeting normative
theories proposing to discriminate among Pareto indifferent allocations on
the basis of fairness principles.
All the fairness approaches that we review in this section satisfy the
Pareto principle. In our terminology, though, they are not welfarist, be-
cause we stick to the classical definition of welfarism in welfare economics.
Welfarism, indeed, is the theory that utilities should be aggregated in the
same way (the utilitarian way, for instance, i.e., summing up utility levels)
independently of the profile of utility functions in the population. Classical
optimal income taxation has always been consistent with this definition of
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welfarism, and the difficulties we have listed in the previous two sections are
closely related to utilitarianism being a welfarist theory of justice.
5.1 Libertarianism
In a recent contribution, Mankiw (2010) revives the libertarian view on
labour income taxation. He advocates a principle of Just Deserts. The
general principle is that “a person who contributes more to society deserves
a higher income that reflects those higher contributions.” In the absence of
market imperfections, “each person’s income reflects the value of what he
contributed to society’s production of goods and services.” Let us note that
the absence of market imperfections is the typical assumption of optimal tax
theory, as the wage rates are assumed to be equal to the real productivity
of the agents. Mankiw also argues that market imperfections, such as pol-
lution, or the provision of public goods, such as fighting poverty, should be
funded according to the agents’ incomes, because richer agents benefit more
from them. As a result, a progressive tax scheme can still emerge from the
libertarian view.
Maybe the most radical departure from the utilitarian approach to tax-
ation, in Mankiw’s approach, is that the issue of how to make interpersonal
comparisons has disappeared from the picture. More precisely, constructing
comparable utilities has been replaced with the application of an extended
version of the laissez-faire objective: earnings are fair if they reflect the nat-
ural differences among people, and these differences come from differences in
talents, which are rewarded at their marginal productivity, and differences in
preferences, which are rewarded proportionally to labor times. Inequalities
due to differences in earning capacities are no longer considered unjust.
This is a rather extreme postulate, in the spectrum of fairness theories.
It does not receive much support from popular views on justice. Using ques-
tionnaire surveys to elicit ethical preferences, Konow (2001) finds support
for the view that “a worker who is twice as productive as another should be
paid twice as much if the higher productivity is due to greater work effort
but not if it is due to innate aptitude” (p. 138).
However, the main point we want to make here is that with a suitable
choice of utility functions one can construct a social welfare function that
seeks to achieve the laissez-faire allocation. Therefore, even libertarian-
ism can be accommodated, at least to some extent, in the social welfare
framework. A key concept here is the notion of money-metric utility, due
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to Samuelson (1974) and which, in this model (after normalizing the price
of consumption to 1), can be defined as (note that in the following formula,
as well as later on in the paper, we use t to denote lump sum transfers) the
value of the expenditure function for a reference wage rate w and the utility
level Ui (zi):
mi (w, zi) = min {t ∈ R | ∃ (`, c) ∈ X, c = t+ w`, Ui (`, c) ≥ Ui (zi)} .
Consider the following social ordering. It applies an inequality averse
social welfare function W to individual well-being indexes which are defined
as the value of the money-metric utility function at the personal wage rate
wi. This social ordering is then represented by the function
W
(
mi (wi, zi)i∈N
)
.
The laissez-faire allocation achieves mi (wi, zi) = 0 for all i, and any form
of redistribution generates a negative mi (wi, zi) for some i. Moreover, for
every feasible allocation the average mi (wi, zi) is non-positive. Therefore,
given the inequality aversion of W , the laissez-faire allocation is the best
feasible allocation. Moreover, this ordering is intuitive because it considers
that the worse-off are those who are in a situation equivalent to suffering the
largest lump-sum tax in the population.
Note that the same laissez-faire conclusion is obtained even when W is
the maximin criterion
W
(
mi (wi, zi)i∈N
)
= min
i
mi (wi, zi) .
The maximin may require that nobody be taxed! This shows that a social
ordering based on the maximin aggregator can be compatible with a wide
array of redistributive policies. This again illustrates the key idea of this
paper, namely, that the choice of utility indexes is the important factor
One could object that the same feat can be achieved by a weighted sum of
utilities, for a suitable choice of weights. While it is true (under mild assump-
tions) that the laissez-faire allocation maximizes a weighted sum of utilities,
the weights depend on the allocation in a complex way. In particular, the
weight of an individual depends on characteristics (preferences, productivity)
of other individuals. In contrast, the money-metric utility is easy to compute
and only depends on the individual’s own characteristics. Plugged into any
economy with an arbitrary profile, and any inequality aversion social welfare
function, it makes the laissez-faire allocation the best. The limitations of
weighted utilitarianism will be discussed further in section 6.
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5.2 Roemer’s theory of equality of opportunity
In contrast to Mankiw, Roemer’s (1993, 1998) theory of equality of opportu-
nity is against rewarding individuals for their natural talents, but it retains
an idea of desert. This theory is inspired by followers of Rawls and Dworkin
in political philosophy, especially Arneson and Cohen (see Arneson 1989, and
Cohen 1989). The central idea of the theory is that the sources of inequali-
ties in individuals’ achievements should be divided in two groups. The first
group gathers individual characteristics for which agents should not be held
responsible. Such characteristics call for compensation, which means that
the resulting inequalities in outcomes should be eliminated. They are called
the “circumstances” of the individuals, and define the “type” of individuals.
The second group gathers the characteristics for which individuals should
be held responsible, typically because individuals control or choose them.
They are called “effort variables.” Agents should be held responsible for
their effort, which means that society should be indifferent to inequalities
in agents’ outcomes that are caused by such characteristics. This is a key
innovation in welfare economics, and it is in sharp contrast with utilitarianism
and welfarism as a whole, since the causes of individuals’ outcomes play a
key role in the evaluation of individual situations.
The social criterion that follows from these principles works as follows.
Roemer assumes that individual outcomes are cardinal and comparable. The
set of agents is partitioned according to their “genuine” effort —more will
be said about this notion in the next paragraph. In each effort group, the
worst-off are given absolute priority, and social welfare is computed as the
average value of outcome for the worst-off of all effort subgroups. In other
words, social welfare is based on the maximin criterion within effort groups,
reflecting the compensation ideal for individuals with identical effort but
unequal circumstances; but the utilitarian criterion is applied between effort
groups, because there is no concern for inequalities linked to differential effort.
Roemer also advocates a particular way to measure genuine effort. He
measures an individual’s effort as the percentile of the distribution of out-
comes at which this individual stands, in the subgroup sharing his circum-
stances. The measurement of effort therefore requires partitioning the pop-
ulation by circumstances (i.e., by types), and measuring effort within each
type by the relative ranks in the distribution of outcome.
Roemer et al. (2003) apply the criterion to optimal taxation. The relevant
achievement is assumed to be income. Observe that income is indeed a
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cardinal and comparable outcome. The set of circumstances is restricted
to the level of education of the individuals’ parents. The set of efforts is
assumed to gather all the characteristics that generate variations in how the
influence of parents’ education is transformed into income. The tax systems
in ten countries are then compared in terms of their ability to equalize the
distribution of incomes across types.
One may think of many other applications of Roemer’s theory to optimal
taxation. In particular, the set of circumstances can be much larger than the
parental education level. It would come closer to the classical objective of
optimal taxation theory to assume that the circumstances of an agent include
her skill. The first objective would then be that two agents having different
skills but the same effort level should also have the same outcome level. We
are then left to define effort and outcome. If income is again retained as the
relevant outcome, and individual effort is measured by the agent’s percentile
in the distribution of his skill group, then the goal becomes the maximization
of the average income of the unskilled agents if their distribution of income is
first-order stochastically dominated by the income distributions of all other
skill groups. This is reminiscent of Besley and Coate’s (1995) study of optimal
taxation under the goal of minimizing the poverty rate. One worry about
such an approach focusing on income is that it is unlikely to satisfy the Pareto
principle.
Another possibility, more respectful of individual preferences, would be
to take utility as the outcome (assuming there is a comparable measure of
utility). The approach would then define effort as the relative rank of an
individual in the distribution of utility in his type. If the distribution of
utility for unskilled agents is dominated by the distribution of utility for the
other types, then the goal is to maximize the average utility of the unskilled
agents. This is similar to an approach followed by Boadway et al. (2002) in
the special case in which there are two skill levels and two preference types
in the economy. In that paper, preferences are assumed to be quasi-linear
in leisure, which gives an easy but superficial solution to the question of the
cardinalization of the preferences.
As Roemer assumes that the relevant outcome is cardinal and compara-
ble, his approach does not solve the difficult question of how to construct
utilities. In fact he explicitly recommends not to use his approach to utili-
ties and has restricted the applications of his criterion to cases in which the
outcomes naturally come in cardinal and comparable units, such as incomes.
This severely limits the relevance of his approach for optimal taxation con-
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ceived as a tool for improving social welfare. But there does not seem to
be a fundamental objection against seeking to extend his approach to social
welfare by taking some relevant notion of well-being as the outcome.
Responsibility in Roemer’s approach and desert in Mankiw’s perspective
seem to follow the same objective, but they are quite different. The difference
is best seen if one thinks of an economy in which all agents would have the
same circumstances, including the same skills. The just desert approach
would recommend to let agents be rewarded according to their skill, and all
income differences would come from different choices, for which no correction
should be implemented. Laissez-faire is considered fair. Roemer’s equality
of opportunity approach would recommend indifference about inequalies in
outcomes, meaning that the utilitarian criterion should be applied. As a
consequence, the optimal policy has no reason to coincide with the laissez-
faire (except when utilities are quasi-linear in consumption). The Roemer
approach is compatible with income redistribution even in economies in which
all agents have the same earning capacities.
5.3 The fair social ordering approach
The third fairness approach we survey offers a combination of the first two
approaches. This approach, indeed, pursues Roemer’s compensation objec-
tive, under the assumption that the effort characteristics are the preferences
of the agents. The principle then requires that agents having the same pref-
erences should also enjoy the same satisfaction level (in the sense of ending
up on the same indifference curve —see below). This is clearly a pairwise
(hence, stronger) version of the compensation objective which, as defined in
section 4, dealt only with the case in which all the population has identical
preferences.
The approach also retains a responsibility objective, but not Roemer’s
utilitarian objective. This principle is replaced with a pairwise version of
the laissez-faire objective: there should be no redistribution between agents
having the same skill level, i.e., they should be submitted to the same degree
of redistribution.11
Let us note that by combining Roemer’s pairwise compensation objective
with the pairwise laissez-faire objective, this approach offers a solution to
11In the literature, the pairwise laissez-faire objective has been variably called the re-
sponsibility principle, the natural reward principle, or the liberal reward principle (see
Fleurbaey 2008 and Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2011a,b).
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Piketty and Saez’s criticism of utilitarianism (section 4). Indeed, restricted
to economies in which all agents have the same preferences, the pairwise
compensation objective boils down to the compensation objective. Restricted
to economies in which all agents have the same productive skill, the pairwise
laissez-faire objective boils down to recommending the laissez-faire allocation.
It is also worth noting that, according to Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012),
there is substantial empirical support for this combination of compensation
and laissez-faire.12
It may be useful at this point to clarify the definition of the (pairwise)
compensation objective and avoid a possible mistake. The compensation
principle requires that two agents having the same preferences should enjoy
the same satisfaction level. It should be clear that this principle remains a
purely ordinal one. Enjoying the same satisfaction level, indeed, means that
these two agents should consume bundles they deem equivalent. Equivalently,
the requirement can be stated by reference to the celebrated (ordinal) fairness
concept of no-envy, introduced in the formal theory of fair allocation by Kolm
(1972) and Varian (1974): such agents should not envy each other.13
In this section, we illustrate the combination of the compensation and the
laissez-faire objectives by introducing an important class of social orderings.
The precise underlying ethical values, and other possible orderings embody-
ing different value judgments, are discussed in greater detail in section 8.
The money-metric utility is the key tool here again. Consider the follow-
ing social ordering. It applies the maximin criterion to individual well-being
indexes which are defined as the value of the money-metric utility function
at a common reference wage w˜. This social ordering is then represented by
the function14
min
i∈N
mi (w˜, zi) .
For the moment, let us only assume that the reference wage lies be-
tween the lowest and the largest wage rates observed in the population:
w˜ ∈ [miniwi,maxiwi]. It therefore has to be a function of, at least, the
12However, they also obtain results which are not in accordance with the theoretical
literature. For instance, some respondents want to widen the market inequalities, even
when they are due to innate talent. A Nietzchean view on redistribution?
13For a detailed study of the relationship between no-envy on the one hand and the
compensation and the liberal reward principles in the other hand, see Fleurbaey (2008)
and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996).
14The well-being index mi (w˜, zi) is the money-metric utility discussed in Preston and
Walker (1999, p. 346) for this same model.
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profile of wage rates in the population. Letting this function remain unspec-
ified, we thus obtain a class of social ordering functions rather than a precise
one. Let us call this the class of reference-wage egalitarian-equivalent15 social
ordering functions.
The first point we want to make here is that, in a first best world,16 every
member of this class of social ordering functions satisfies the combination of
the compensation and laissez-faire objectives discussed in section 4. Consider
the case in which all preferences are identical. Pick any common represen-
tation of the agents’ preferences, U0. The social ordering that maximizes
mini∈N U0 (zi) is then exactly the same as every member of the reference-
wage egalitarian-equivalent class. Indeed, when preferences are identical, the
ranking of individuals in terms of money-metric utilities is then the same as
the ranking in terms of utility U0 (zi), whatever w˜, because mi (w˜, zi) is a
numerical representation of the same preferences as U0, for all w˜. The result
that utilities are equalized in a first-best context then follows from the fact
that the social ordering is a maximin.
A frequent criticism against this form of egalitarianism is that when pref-
erences are identical but utility functions differ, picking a common represen-
tation or a money-metric utility that only depends on ordinal preferences
ignores potentially relevant inequalities in utilities that come from unequal
capacities for enjoyment (see, e.g., Boadway 2012, p. 521). In order to
address this criticism, two possibilities must be considered.
The first possibility is that the different calibrations of satisfaction simply
reflect that some individuals are more difficult to satisfy than others. This
directly connects to the discussion of “expensive tastes” and adaptation in
section 3. It is clear that fairness is on the side of well established approaches
that ignore such differences in utilities.
The second possibility is that the capacities for enjoyment reflect internal
parameters (metabolism, health, mental health, etc.) that matter to indi-
viduals and create real inequalities. If the criticism that our compensation
objective does not take these inequalities sufficiently into account is based on
this fact, it means that the model is incomplete and such internal parame-
15The idea of “egalitarian-equivalence” is due to Pazner and Schmeidler (1978). The
expression refers to a social criterion that seeks to achieve an allocation that is Pareto-
indifferent to an egalitarian allocation. In the case at hand, the egalitarian allocation grants
all individuals an equal budget with no tax and a wage rate equal to w˜.
16The first best world is also the second best world when preferences are special and
make agents work the same labor quantity for all tax functions.
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ters have to be made explicit, together with individual preferences over them.
Note that agents would then have three sources of heterogeneity in such an
extended model.17 In conclusion, either way, the criticism can be suitably
addressed. We continue the discussion, though, under the assumption that
agents only differ in productivity and preferences.
Let us come back to the combination of the compensation and laissez-
faire objectives and check the laissez-faire side of the picture. When all
productivities are equal, necessarily w˜ must equal the common wage rate,
and equality of mi (w˜, zi) is achieved by the laissez-faire allocation (with a
poll tax G/n), which is also efficient and incentive compatible, and therefore
maximizes the lowest mi (w˜, zi) under the relevant constraints of feasibility
and incentive compatibility.
Admittedly, the two cases of identical preferences and equal productivi-
ties are very special, and it is important to check if a social ordering function
in the reference-wage egalitarian-equivalent class behaves well in other cases.
The main observation is that the compensation property for identical pref-
erences indeed applies to pairs of individuals. Reducing inequalities between
two individuals sharing the same preferences is always deemed acceptable for
a reference-wage egalitarian-equivalent social ordering, and is even deemed
a strict improvement if one considers the leximin variant of such a social
ordering.18 In other words, the pairwise compensation principle (i.e., seek to
eliminate all inequalities between pairs of individuals who differ only in their
productivities) is fully satisfied.
This compensation effort actually goes beyond the case of individuals with
identical preferences. It also applies to cases in which one agent’s indifference
curve in X lies everywhere above another agent’s. In this case, both agents
agree that the bundle of goods consumed by the former agent is preferable to
the bundle consumed by the latter. Moreover, they both also agree that any
bundle that the former agent finds indifferent to the bundle he consumed is
preferable to any bundle that the latter agent finds indifferent to the bundle
he consumes. In that case, the money-metric utility of the latter is necessarily
lower than the former’s. Consequently, the maximin objective recommends
to transfer goods from the former to the latter agent. Such a transfer reduces
17Such a triple-heterogeneity model is studied by Fleurbaey and Valletta (2014). The
problem of compensating for unequal internal characteristics is developed at length in a
related literature (Fleurbaey 2008, Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2011b, 2012).
18The leximin extends the maximin lexicographically by considering the very worst-off,
then the second worst-off, and so on.
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the “inequality in indifference curves” between these two agents.
The same pairwise extension holds for the laissez-faire property, but in
a more modest form.19 It applies to individuals having the same wage rate,
but only when their common wage rate is equal to w˜. For this special case
wi = wj = w˜, the counterpart of the laissez-faire ideal is that the equality
mi (w˜, zi) = mj (w˜, zj) is achieved in the first best. This means that the two
individuals are just as satisfied as they would be by receiving an identical
lump-sum transfer or paying an identical lump-sum tax and working at their
common wage rate. This partial laissez-faire outcome is directly related to
the way utilities are constructed. For individuals with a common wage rate
wi = wj that does not differ too much from w˜, this laissez-faire property will
only hold approximately, i.e., the equality mi (wi, zi) = mj (wj, zj) will be
approximately satisfied.
Therefore one sees that a reference-wage egalitarian-equivalent social or-
dering function consistently seeks to reduce inequalities in indifference curves
(whether they belong to the same preferences or not), and in a milder form
seeks to avoid allocations that depart too much from the laissez-faire when
redistribution is not needed.
There exist other social ordering functions that are much stronger with
respect to satisfying the pairwise laissez-faire objective (seeking to equalize
transfers for all pairs of agents with identical wage rates) and slightly less
strong on compensation (elimination of inequalities in indifference curves
for each pair of agents with identical preferences is obtained for a subset of
preferences). The basic idea underlying their construction, along with one
core example, is developed in section 8. Their implications for taxation are
studied in detail in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2007, 2011a,c).
One might want to question the extreme form of egalitarianism that is
adopted through the maximin approach. The literature on fair social order-
ings (see, in particular, Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2011a, Chap. 3), echoing
earlier studies of the money-metric utility (Blackorby and Donaldson 1988),
shows that mild egalitarian requirements (such as convexity of the social or-
dering on Xn) can be satisfied only with an absolute priority for the worst-off
when the evaluation satisfies informational simplicity requirements.
The reasoning behind this absolute priority to the worst-off goes as fol-
19The fact that one property (the compensation principle) is satisfied to a larger extent
than the other (the laissez-faire) is due to a logical tension between the two. This is further
discussed in Section 8.
22
lows. The Pareto criterion forces us to aggregate satisfaction levels or indif-
ference curves, which means that not too much attention can be paid to the
bundles of goods consumed by the agents. On the other hand, the fairness
objectives that have been studied so far are defined as Pigou-Dalton transfer
requirements: a transfer of resources from an advantaged agent to a relatively
disadvantaged one is a social improvement. Consequently, fairness forces us
to look at what agents consume. Combining the Pareto criterion with this
transfer requirement turns out to be very demanding. This is typically the
case when the shape of the preferences of the agents is such that the value
for them of a given transfer depends on the bundle they originally consume
when they receive that transfer. A transfer of a given amount of resources at
a certain level of work may be, in terms of preferences satisfaction, equivalent
at another level of work to the loss of an arbitrarily large amount of resources
by the richer agent combined with the gain of an arbitrarily small amount
of resources by the relatively poor one. It is intuitive that as a consequence,
transfers are a social improvement only if we use a maximin aggregator.20
The maximin conclusion can be avoided by applying the Pigou-Dalton
transfer requirements only to profiles of preferences that are sufficiently reg-
ular (e.g., homothetic or quasi-linear) in order to avoid the equivalence be-
tween balanced transfers and unbalanced transfers depicted in the previous
paragraph. One then obtains social orderings with a less than absolute pri-
ority for the worst-off.
As we mentioned in the previous subsection, Roemer’s theory of equal-
ity of opportunity relies on a distinction between circumstances and effort.
In the usual optimal income tax model, agents are characterized by their
preferences and their skill. That forces us to put the cut between circum-
stances and effort between these two characteristics. It would be possible,
however, to enrich the model with other elements, such as the influence of
family background on preferences, and study the compensation and laissez-
faire objectives with another cut. However, there is an interesting difference
between Roemer’s approach and this one. In Roemer’s perspective, a family
background influencing preferences may be a genuine handicap in attaining
the relevant outcome (such as income). In the approach described here, there
is no comparable outcome and one cannot view an influence on preferences
20However, a full argument requires an additional restriction on the information about
indifference curves that can be used to evaluate a transfer, or a separability property for
the evaluation of subpopulations. See Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2011a, Chap. 3 for details.
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as a handicap in the satisfaction of these preferences. Instead, such an influ-
ence must be viewed as distorting preferences and implying that the agent’s
situation should be assessed with “ideal” preferences, i.e., preferences that
would be free from the alleged influence. The fairness literature has been
reluctant to follow this route because it means dropping the Pareto principle
and considering that individual preferences are not fully respectable. This
is, however, a route familiar to the literature on behavioral phenomena such
as myopia and hyperbolic discounting (Choi et al. 2003).
5.4 Luck and desert
Saez and Stantcheva (2013), inspired in particular by Alesina and Angeletos
(2005), examine the case in which individual income has two components,
the ordinary earnings and a random shock, which for simplicity is assumed
to have a zero mean. They show in particular that if only the individu-
als with net income below their earnings are given a positive weight in the
social objective, income taxation may have to be greater when the random
shock has greater variance relative to post-tax earnings, creating a reinforcing
mechanism that can generate multiple equilibria. Low-tax equilibria incur
a lower random shock relative to post-tax earnings, justifiying the low tax,
and conversely for the high-tax equilibria.
As a matter of fact, the separation between luck and desert is at the core
of the literature that has just been reviewed in the previous subsections. The
decomposition of gross income into a deserved and an undeserved part can be
analyzed easily using Roemer’s approach or the fair social ordering approach.
In Roemer’s approach, the random shock can be added to the circum-
stances, and if the random shock is uncorrelated with the pre-shock outcome
in each type, the partitioning of individuals in terms of “genuine effort” is
unchanged. Then, the worst type, when luck is included in the description of
type, gathers the individuals with bad luck and bad otherwise circumstances.
Roemer’s criterion would then advocate maximizing their average outcome.
In the fair social ordering approach, one would also treat the random
shock as a circumstance to be compensated, and would apply the laissez-
faire principle only to the pairs of individuals sharing the same skill and the
same shock. Interestingly, this does not require any change to the index
measure. Indeed, the money-metric utility mi (w˜, zi) defined in the previous
subsection displays the nice dual property that two individuals with the same
preferences, but possibly different skills and/or different luck, should ideally
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be given final bundles on the same indifference curve, whereas for individuals
with wage rate equal to w˜, the ideal state is to give them lump-sum transfers
cancelling their inequalities in luck and let them work freely (with no further
tax).
The advantage of this approach is that it provides a sensible ordering
of individuals, that makes it possible to prioritize the very worst-off (if the
maximin criterion is adopted) or to give a positive weight to all individu-
als, but with decreasing priority according to their position as measured by
mi (w˜, zi).
If one adopts the view that earned income is fully deserved and only
the random shock is undeserved, then one can use another utility function,
namely mi (wi, zi), which we have shown to be associated with the libertar-
ian approach. As the random shocks are equivalent to redistribution between
individuals, any inequality averse social welfare function applied to the distri-
bution of mi (wi, zi) will seek to undo them via a compensating redistribution.
This approach is unlikely to end up giving equal positive weight to those with
a net income below their earnings, because it will prioritize those with the
greater gap.
There is another interesting difference with the weights proposed by Saez
and Stantcheva. The weights they propose can generate multiple equilibria
because the relative share of the shocks over income is endogenous to the
tax. In particular, if the tax is 100%, as they note, the post-tax earnings
are null and all income is undeserved (and has zero elasticity), implying that
the optimal tax is indeed 100%. In contrast, a social welfare function with
mi (wi, zi) is unlikely to generate multiple equilibria and to be satisfied with a
100% tax. The reason is that it does not treat post-tax earnings as deserved
when they are strongly distorted by the tax. It treats the tax as being just
as bad as a negative shock when it reduces mi (wi, zi). It therefore offers a
defense of the principle that individuals deserve to keep their earnings of the
laissez-faire allocation, rather than any (distorted) earnings.
6 Does weighting utilities yield fair outcomes?
The key building block of the reference-wage egalitarian-equivalent social
ordering functions is the money-metric utility mi (w˜, zi) which makes inter-
personal comparisons of resources appropriate in the double way that was
needed to achieve the desired combination of the compensation and laissez-
25
faire objectives, that is, both among agents with identical preferences and
agents with the reference wage rate. Individuals with identical preferences
are compared in terms of indifference curves (and this extends to individuals
with different preferences but non-crossing indifference curves), and individ-
uals with the reference wage rate are compared in terms of the lump-sum
transfers they receive when tax operates by lump-sum transfers (of which
the laissez-faire is a degenerate case).
That these two ways of making interpersonal comparisons can be per-
formed by the same well-being indexes is quite notable. The money-metric
utility has generally been considered in the profession as a mere convenience,
although it was sometimes presented as more than that. For instance, Deaton
and Muellbauer (1980, p. 225) suggest that the money-metric utility reflects
“the budget constraints to which the agents are submitted”.21 The money-
metric utility respects individual preferences while using an objective rod to
compare individual situations. This combination enables it to respect indi-
vidual preferences not only for intrapersonal comparisons but also for inter-
personal comparisons when individuals unambiguously agree about who has
a better situation because indifference curves do not cross. It also enables it
to be sensitive to transfers in the case of individuals with the reference wage
rate.
It is remarkable how many possibilities are offered for social evaluation by
an appropriate selection of well-being indexes, even under the restriction that
the indexes must be utility functions that represent individual preferences,
and even under the restriction that the maximin criterion will be ultimately
applied to the distribution of such indexes. A substantial portion of this
diversity of possibilities, and the underlying ethical issues, is illustrated in
section 8.
Before exploring what ethical principles may guide the selection of suit-
able indexes, it is worth examining a more basic question. If the population
comes with a given profile of utility functions (U1, ..., Un), is it necessary
to replace such functions by indexes like mi (w˜, zi) before applying a social
welfare function (such as the maximin)? Couldn’t one simply weight these
utility functions in a utilitarian sum?
21See also Deaton (1980, p. 51): “I believe that practical welfare measurement should
be fundamentally based on opportunities rather than on their untestable consequences.
No government is going to give special treatment to an individual who claims his extra
sensibilities require special facilities, at least not without some objective evidence of why
money means something different to him than to anyone else.” (emphasis added)
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Facing the problem of heterogeneous utilities, the literature22 has indeed
considered weighting them in a utilitarian social welfare function
∑
i∈N αiUi (zi).
These coefficients αi’s are the so-called Pareto weights referred to in the in-
troduction (quoting Piketty and Saez 2012). It is true that, provided the
utility possibility set is convex, every (constrained) efficient allocation can
be viewed as optimal for such a weighted utilitarian function. One could
therefore imagine seeking the weights αi that induce the same choice of tax
function as, for instance, a reference-wage egalitarian-equivalent social order-
ing. But this idea does not work, as we now explain.
Let us consider a second-best world, in which only incomes are observable.
Assume that the individuals with the lowest wage rate are sufficiently diverse
in preferences so that they span all the labor-consumption preferences of the
population. It is then possible to derive the conclusion that, at the socially
best allocation, only them should be given a positive weight. This is because,
under the incentive constraints, a less productive agent necessarily faces a
less favorable budget set than a more productive agent. Therefore, an agent
with a high wage rate will always have a higher well-being index mi (w˜, zi)
than an agent with the same preferences and the lowest wage rate. The
latter agent should then be given full priority over the former, because the
objective is a maximin.
The question then becomes: for two agents, say j and k, having different
preferences and the lowest wage rate, how should we determine αj and αk?
The key point is that their value would have to depend on the whole pro-
file of the population, because this profile determines the set of feasible and
incentive-compatible allocations, and therefore the exact bundles assigned
to these agents in the optimal allocation. That is, once we have identified
the second-best optimal allocation for a reference-wage egalitarian-equivalent
social ordering, it is possible to compute the corresponding α’s. But it is im-
possible to guess what these weights should be before computing the optimal
allocation. Therefore the Pareto weights methodology cannot help in finding
the optimal allocation.
The correct weights, moreover, would be of limited use even if they could
be guessed, because the function
∑
i∈N αiUi (zi) using these weights is only
good at selecting the best allocation. It cannot reliably be used to evaluate
suboptimal allocations, for instance in the context of a reform in which both
the pre-reform and the post-reform allocations are suboptimal. The evalu-
22See in particular Boadway et al. (2002), Kaplow (2008), Chone´ and Laroque (2012).
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ation might then go against what the reference-wage egalitarian-equivalent
social ordering recommends for such suboptimal allocations. As a result, new
α’s would have to be computed for each new problem, that is, as a function
of the set of allocations among which the choice has to be made, and, again,
the values of these α’s could only be ascertained after the optimal allocation
is identified.
We can apply these ideas to the recent interesting work of Lockwood and
Weinzerl (2014). Following the simplifying method to deal with heteroge-
nous preferences introduced by Brett and Weymark (2003), they assume
that individual heterogeneity is one-dimensional. First, preferences are pa-
rameterized by a unidimensional number θi. Moreover, preferences and skill
interact in such a way that all agents with the same ni = θiwi are behav-
iorally indistinguishable and have the same utility U (y/n, c) at the same
earning-consumption bundle (y, c).
They rely on a weighted social welfare function∫ ∞
0
αnU (n) f (n) dn,
where U (n) is a short notation for U (y (n) /n, c (n)), the utility of agents i
such that ni = n. The marginal social value of consumption c (n) is αng (n),
where g (n) = ∂U (n) /∂c (n) is the marginal utility of consumption. They
propose to make αn inversely proportional to
E
[
gLF (θiw¯) | ni = n
]
,
i.e., the average value, among the agents of (actual) parameter n, of g (.) in
the laissez-faire allocation of a hypothetical economy in which all agents have
the average wage rate w¯ of the actual economy. When the actual economy
already has equal wage rates for all, the computation of such weights implies
that αng
LF (n) is a constant in n and laissez-faire is an optimal allocation.
An alternative method would start from the individual weights, for each
individual i, that would deliver the laissez-faire in the hypothetical economy
with equalized wages: αi = 1/g
LF (θiw¯). One cannot actually use such
weights at the individual level because θi is not observed. But, given that the
incentive-compatible allocations give the same utility U (n) to agents with
the same n, the weighted utilitarian objective can be written:∫
i
αiUi =
∫ ∞
0
αnU (n) f (n) dn,
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for
αn = E [αi | ni = n]
= E
[
1/gLF (θiw¯) | ni = n
]
.
The evaluation of incentive-compatible allocations according to
∫∞
0
αnU (n) f (n) dn
for such weights αn always coincides with the evaluation that would be made
with the “correct” individual weights αi.
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Whatever the precise formula for the weights, the evaluation of allocations
in the actual economy is not geared toward the laissez-faire in any clear way.
In particular, the weighted objective does not pursue the pairwise laissez-faire
objective in the actual economy, even for agents with average wage. Take
two agents j and k enjoying the average wage rate w¯ but different θj, θk. The
sum
Uj (zj) /g
LF (θjw¯) + Uk (zj) /g
LF (θkw¯)
has no reason to seek equal tax treatment for these two agents in the actual
economy when they are far from the laissez-faire bundles they would receive
in the hypothetical economy.
The problem would persist if one considered a weighted form of max-
imin in which the same exogenous utility functions are weighted before the
maximin criterion is applied to them. Therefore, it does not appear very
promising to rely solely on weighting utilities in order to enrich the classical
social welfare function. What is needed is a more sophisticated choice of an
appropriate representation of individual preferences.
The replacement of arbitrary utility functions Ui (zi) by suitable well-
being indexes is therefore not a superfluous exercise that could be mimicked
by a weighting system. Weighted utilitarianism is not the all-purpose tool
that it is often believed to be. Relying on it in order to incorporate the
fairness principles that underlie reference-wage egalitarian-equivalent and
similar social ordering functions is possible only if the weights are specific
to the allocation that is evaluated and depend on the whole profile of the
population. Far from being the simplest amendment to classical welfare eco-
nomics, weighted utilitarianism seems an arduous detour compared to the
direct adoption of well-being indexes such as the no less classical money-
metric utility.
23Lockwood and Weinzierl’s weights are the harmonic mean of the individual weights
αi, in every n group, instead of the arithmetic mean.
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7 Weighting incomes
An important progress in optimal taxation theory has been recently accom-
plished by Saez (2001, 2002) and followed up by Saez and Stantcheva (2013).
This progress has been made possible by a shift of focus. In Saez’ formu-
lation, social preferences are represented by weights that are endogenously
assigned to incomes at the contemplated allocation, rather than to utility
levels. The underlying rationale is illuminatingly simple. For a social welfare
function
∑
i αiUi (zi), a marginal change δT to the function T will induce a
change in social welfare equal, by the envelope theorem,24 to∑
i
αi
∂Ui
∂ci
δT (yi) .
This expression can be read as a sum over earning levels y of the change in
tax δT (y) weighted by the total marginal social weight of the subpopulation
earning the level y. A difficulty with this approach is that the weights are
endogenous and depend on the particular allocation under consideration. In
this section, we show how the theory of fair social orderings can help compute
these weights.25
A simplification comes from the fact that, given that fair social orderings
are of the maximin type, the maximal weight will be assigned to the agents
exhibiting the lowest value of the well-being index. In a first-best context,
of course, these values should be equalized, in which case all agents have a
positive weight. In the second-best context of optimal taxation theory, it is
24The additional term∑
i
αi
(
∂Ui
∂ci
(1− T ′ (yi)) dyi + ∂Ui
∂`i
d`i
)
vanishes when either the first-order condition
∂Ui
∂ci
(1− T ′ (yi))wi + ∂Ui
∂`i
= 0
or the condition dyi = d`i = 0 (obtained for bunching at `i = 0 or `i = 1) holds for all
agents.
25Saez and Stantcheva (2013) provide many examples covering tagging, desert, fairness.
They extend the approach to cases in which the weights are not related to an underlying
social welfare function, which enlarges the set of possible ethical approaches covered by
their analysis. We restrict attention here to weights which derive from a social ordering
(transitivity and the Pareto principle are respected).
30
quite likely that it will be impossible to equalize well-being levels. In that
case, the agents whose well-being is bounded below by incentive compatibility
constraints will receive a weight of zero.
In some cases, the objective of maximizing the minimal value of some
well-being index enables us to completely determine the weights that should
be assigned to incomes. In this section, we present two such cases. In both
cases, we assume that the planner is interested in “maximinning” a particular
well-being index in the reference-wage egalitarian-equivalent family presented
above, mi(wmin, zi), where wmin = mini∈N wi.
The first case is a reform context. Let us assume that a tax scheme
prevails but is not optimal. A reform has to be designed, but the tax scheme
can only be changed marginally. How should we change it?
The reasoning is illustrated in Fig. 1. It represents the pre-tax/after-
tax income space. The 45◦ line represents the relation between pre-tax and
after-tax incomes in the absence of taxation. The tax scheme that we try to
evaluate, T , is represented by the corresponding function that describes how
after-tax incomes, c, depend on pre-tax incomes, y: c = y − T (y).
-
y
6
c
0
T
•c∗
y∗
mi0(wmin, (
y∗
wmin
, c∗))
45◦
wmin w′ w′′
Figure 1: Deriving the income weights: the case of a reform.
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Evaluating a tax scheme requires identifying the agents with the lowest
well-being index. It is convenient to do it in two steps. First, the agents
with the lowest well-being index need to be identified in each productivity
subgroup. Let us begin with agents whose productivity is equal to wmin.
Given our assumption that labor is bounded (0 ≤ `i ≤ 1), we know that
these agents earn an income in the [0, wmin] interval (remember that wi also
stands for agent i’s income, would he work full time).
Let y∗ ∈ [0, wmin] be the pre-tax income for which the tax T (y) is maximal
over the [0, wmin] interval. Graphically, y
∗ is the abscissa of the point of
tangency between the curve representing T and a 45◦ line.26 Let us assume
that some agents with minimal productivity, one of them having index i0,
earn an income of y∗.27 Given the tax scheme, this allows them to reach an
after-tax income of c∗.
Individual i0’s choice reveals that he prefers bundle (
y∗
wmin
, c∗) to all other
possible bundles affordable given the tax scheme. The segment of a 45◦
line that is tangent to the function describing T is also drawn in the figure.
We claim it represents the implicit budget of agent i0, i.e., the budget c =
t + wmin` = t + y that underlies the computation of mi0(wmin, zi0). Indeed,
the slope of that budget, from the point of view of agent i0, is precisely
wmin, because it is her actual productivity, so that it corresponds to her
marginal pay in the absence of taxation. Consequently, the intercept of that
segment measures the value of the well-being index of agent i0 at that bundle,
mi0(wmin, (
y∗
wmin
, c∗)).
It is impossible, on the other hand, to draw the implicit budgets of the
agents having their productivity equal to wmin but choosing other bundles:
their choice does not reveal sufficient information for us to identify their
indifference curve. What we can say about them, however, is that their
choice reveals that they prefer their bundle not only to ( y
∗
wmin
, c∗), but also
to any bundle in the budget line determined by wmin and containing the
26In this example, y∗ is interior to the interval. It need not be the case. It is even quite
likely to have y∗ = wmin.
27This assumption, actually, can be imposed without loss of generality. Indeed, if no
agent earns that income, then the tax scheme is irrelevant at that income level, so that
the tax amount can be decreased until it becomes relevant, that is, until one agent is
indifferent between her bundle and this new bundle. In that case, we can assume that this
agent actually chooses the new bundle. Consequently, the only assumption that is needed
is that as soon as a group of agents are willing to earn some income level in the range
[0, wmin], there is at least one agent among them who has the lowest productivity wmin.
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bundle (y∗, c∗) , because this budget line is never above the budget curve
delineated by the tax. As a consequence, their implicit budget is not below
agent i0’s. This just proves that the agents choosing to earn y
∗ among the
lowest productivity agents have the lowest well-being index.
Second, we need to compare the well-being index among agents of differ-
ent productivity subgroups. Given that we only need to identify who has the
lowest well-being index in the population, we can focus on agents having the
same or a lower well-being index than agent i0.
Two more lines are drawn in the figure, starting from the intercept
mi0(wmin, (
y∗
wmin
, c∗)). They represent the implicit budget of agents having
their productivity equal to w′ and w′′ respectively. Their slope is lower than
that of the implicit budget of agent i0. Indeed, productivity wmin is not
their actual productivity. The implicit budgets should tell us how much they
would earn, should their productivity be equal to wmin, which is a fraction
wmin/w
′ (resp., wmin/w′′) of their actual productivity. These fractions are the
precise slopes of the two lines.
The figure shows that these two implicit budgets are strictly below the
function describing the tax scheme. It is a necessary consequence of the fact
that this function is increasing. This means that all agents having a greater
productivity than wmin prefer their actual bundle to being allowed to maxi-
mize their preferences over implicit budgets of intercept mi0(wmin, (
y∗
wmin
, c∗)).
As a result, all agents having a productivity equal to w′ or w′′, and, more
generally, greater than wmin, have an implicit budget above agent i0’s. The
latter is therefore the agent with the lowest well-being index. The egalitar-
ian planner should therefore assign a positive weight to income y∗ and a zero
weight to all other incomes that are strictly above the 45◦ line segment that
is tangent to the budget at y∗.
The second case in which it is possible to derive income weights is when
the planner tries to maximin the well-being index mi(wmin, zi) and the allo-
cation is second-best optimal for these social preferences. More precisely, we
will show that the marginal rate of taxation should be zero on incomes below
wmin, and all income weights should be zero above wmin. This gives us a
precise formula for the optimal tax scheme for those social preferences. This
case is also discussed in Saez and Stantcheva (2013), and we will provide an
intuitive explanation for the zero marginal tax result.
The intuition for this result is illustrated in Fig. 2. Let us consider the
tax function T . The marginal rates of taxation differ from zero below wmin.
We need to show that it cannot be optimal.
33
By the same reasoning as for the first case above, we can identify the level
of the lowest well-being index in the population. It is the intercept of the
lowest implicit budget that is tangent to the budget function representing T
from below in the [0, wmin] range of incomes. It is denoted b in the figure.
Formally,
b = min
y≤wmin
(−T (y)) .
Observe that all agents earning an income of y′ or less have a subsidy greater
than b.
Let us now consider the new tax function T ′. It consists in applying a
constant amount of subsidy, b, to all income levels lower than y′. Beyond y′,
T and T ′ coincide. Compared to T , the new tax scheme T ′ has two important
features.
First, the minimal well-being level remains identical at b. The planner
interested in maximinning mi(wmin, zi) is, therefore, indifferent between T
and T ′.
Second, compared to T , the new scheme T ′ allows the planner to obtain
a budget surplus. Indeed, all agents who earn more than y′ under T will
continue to earn exactly the same income under T ′. Their influence on the
budget remains the same. Agents earning less than y′ under T are likely to
change their labor time, and, therefore, their earning, but the key point is
that they will move from an income at which they received a subsidy of at
least b to another income at which they receive a subsidy of at most b. That
is, no tax payer will pay less tax under T ′ than under T , and some of them
will pay more. This proves that the planner will now run a budget surplus.
By redistributing this surplus to all agents (which can be done by slightly
translating the budget curve generated by T ′ upwards), we can obtain a new
allocation which strictly Pareto dominates the previous one, thereby strictly
increasing its lowest well-being level above b. This proves that T cannot be
optimal. As a result, we need a tax scheme that is flat in the [0, wmin] range
of incomes, in which all agents receive the same subsidy: the marginal tax
rate is equal to zero in this range.
How should incomes be taxed above wmin? As we proved in the first part
of this section, the well-being index of agents earning more than wmin, and,
therefore, having a larger productivity than wmin, cannot be lower than the
well-being index of the agents having the lowest productivity. The only ob-
jective of taxing those incomes should then be to maximize the tax return
so as to have as large a subsidy on low incomes as possible (under the con-
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Figure 2: Optimal allocations for Rwminlex and R
˜`EW have a zero marginal
rate on low incomes.
straint, of course, that after-tax income remains an increasing function of
pre-tax income). This is achieved by applying the Saez (2001) formula with
a weight of zero on all incomes above wmin, if one assumes that the first order
approach on which the formula relies is valid. In the simple case of no in-
come effect, the marginal taxation rates are a function of the elasticity of the
earning supply, the cumulative distribution of the earnings and its density,
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which we denote (y), F (y) and f(y) respectively. We obtain28
∀y ≤ wmin, T ′(y) = 0
∀y ≥ wmin, T
′(y)
1− T ′(y) =
1− F (y)
(y)yf(y)
.
In conclusion, the optimal tax scheme that should be implemented by an
egalitarian planner interested in the mi(wmin, zi) index of well-being consists
in a zero marginal rate on incomes below wmin and a marginal tax rate that
follows Saez’ formula with zero weights above wmin.
There are other cases in which the determination of weights is not as
simple. For the different social ordering studied in Fleurbaey and Maniquet
(2006), for instance, one can show that the marginal tax rate at a second-
best allocation is non-positive on average over low incomes, but the lowest
well-being level may be attained by a subset of the low income agents that
is hard to identify, so that the weights at the optimal allocation cannot be
easily determined.
In conclusion, this section shows that the weights approach, though use-
ful, does not always provide a short-cut, unfortunately, for the determination
of the optimal tax. Note also that when the social ordering is not a maximin,
the determination of the optimal tax and the associated marginal social wel-
fare weights for incomes is harder. This belongs to the set of open questions
for future research.
8 Four ethical choices
In the previous sections we have emphasized the need to carefully select the
utility indexes (instead of just weighting them), and have hinted at the wide
possibilities offered by the relevant span of indexes. In this section we analyze
28If the income effect is different from zero, then, the second part of the formula needs
to be replaced with
T ′(y)
1− T ′(y) =
1
c(y)yf∗(y)
∫ ∞
y
exp
[∫ y′
y
(
1− 
u(z)
c(z)
)
dz
z
]
f(y′)dy′,
where u and c stand for the uncompensated and compensated earning supply elasticity
functions, respectively, and f∗ is a modified density functon. See Saez (2001) for the
derivation of this formula, and Jacquet and Lehmann (2014) for a similar formula.
36
this array of possibilities and try to make the underlying ethical choices
transparent, so that practitioners can easily connect with the methodology of
choosing utility indexes. The theory of fair social orderings has mostly relied
on an axiomatic approach. While this is useful to theorists who want to
grasp the logical underpinnings of the objects under study, practitioners seek
a more direct reading of the meaning of the tools they use. Therefore, here,
we ignore the formal aspect of axiomatics and focus on the intuitive meaning
of the various features on an index of well-being. Our analysis here echoes
a review of indexes in Preston and Walker (1994), where the underlying
normative principles were not made explicit, and an analysis in Decoster and
Haan (2014), where three main examples of indexes are discussed together
with their ethical meaning.
We will focus on four ethical choices that guide the selection of a well-
being index in the taxation model: 1) Does one trust subjective utility or
rely only on ordinal preferences? 2) Does one seek to reduce inequalities
due to unequal skills or consider that individuals deserve them? 3) Does
one prioritize the inequalities due to unequal skills or the inequalities of
tax treatment between equally-skilled individuals? 4) Does one want to pay
special attention to the individuals with high or low aversion to work? While
the first two questions are obvious and relate to issues already discussed, the
last two are less obviously relevant and their importance will be explained
below.
1) Does one trust subjective utility or rely only on ordinal pref-
erences?
As explained in section 3, indexes that are constructed on the basis of
individuals’ ordinal preferences are less vulnerable to the “expensive tastes”
and the adaptation problem than subjective declarations of utility or satisfac-
tion. Moreover, subjective declarations may contradict the individuals’ own
interpersonal comparisons, which are especially compelling when indifference
curves do not cross. An individual may be on higher indifference curves but
declare a lower satisfaction, simply because individual self-assessments rely
on heterogenous standards.
It may be objected that utility takes account not only of standards of
satisfaction, but also of other aspects of the individual’s situation than the
labor-consumption bundle that is the focus of the taxation model. This is
an important objection, and it calls for embedding the model into a larger
space in which the relevant aspects of life that individuals care about are
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taken into account. Truly enough, this objection falls short of providing a
reason to take subjective utility at face value. Nonetheless, it does raise a
serious question when the model is not enlarged, because an approach that
only looks at ordinal preference over labor-consumption bundles may miss
important dimensions of inequality.
It is commonly believed that no interpersonal comparisons can be made
on the basis of individual ordinal non-comparable preferences. In the rest of
this section we focus on indexes that are based on ordinal non-comparable
preferences in order to show the wide array of possibilities offered by this
informational basis.
2) Does one seek to reduce inequalities due to unequal skills or
consider that individuals deserve the fruits of their talents?
We have seen in section 5 that the money-metric utilities mi (w˜, zi) , fed
into an inequality-averse social welfare function, do seek to eliminate inequal-
ities due to skills between individuals having the same preferences, whereas
the different money-metric utilities mi (wi, zi) embody the libertarian goal of
letting the skilled individuals enjoy their advantage.
Interestingly, one could explore a compromise view in which one would
use the indexes mi (λw˜ + (1− λ)wi, zi), in order to let individuals enjoy their
skills to some extent (1 − λ) and contain inequalities due to skills to the
complementary extent (λ).
More importantly, one can also generalize the indexes and observe that a
money-metric utility really defines a budget rather than just a number. One
can then choose what part of the budget to consider for the comparison across
money-metric utilities. This, of course, is of no consequence for money-metric
utilities of the mi (w˜, zi) sort, because all the implicit budgets are parallel.
But for the mi (wi, zi) indexes, it matters a lot, because their slope in the
(`, c) space is wi, so that the budget lines often cross.
A simple generalization of the mi (wi, zi) indexes, therefore, consists in
picking a reference value ˜` for labor and evaluating how much one would
consume with the implicit budget if one worked ˜` hours. This is computed
as the index mi (wi, zi) + wi ˜`. Such an index has been advocated at length
in Kolm (2004).
When this new index is equal across individuals, their implicit budgets
cross at the point where ` = ˜`. To sum up, we obtain the general index
mi (w˜i, zi) + w˜i ˜`,
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where w˜i = λwi + (1− λ) w˜. The construction of the value of this index for
a general bundle zi and utility function Ui is illustrated in Figure 3 (slopes
of budget lines are noted between parentheses below the line). With such
an index, there are two ways to seek redistribution across individuals with
unequal skills. One way is to let the personalized reference wage w˜i be equal
across individuals (λ = 1), yielding the index mi (w˜, zi) + w˜ ˜` which is, up to
a constant, equivalent to mi (w˜, zi). Another way to adopt a redistributive
attitude is to pick a large value for ˜`, because one then seeks to make the
implicit budgets for the skilled agents low compared to those of the less skilled
agents. When ˜` = 1, one seeks to equalize the full incomes corresponding
to these implicit budgets, which is extreme because the implicit budgets for
greater skills are then dominated by the implicit budgets for lower skills
(except at ` = 1, where they meet).
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Figure 3: The construction of well-being indices:
A further generalization (explored in Fleurbaey and Maniquet 1996) would
not focus on a particular labor reference ˜`, and would instead pick a reference
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preference ordering and apply a corresponding indirect utility function to the
various implicit budgets.29 In order words, budgets would be compared by
the indifference curves of the reference preference relation that are tangent
to the budgets.
There are, thus, two ways of introducing a redistributive attitude in the
indexes mi (w˜i, zi) + w˜i ˜`, where w˜i = λwi+ (1− λ) w˜: let λ→ 1 or let ˜`→ 1.
A natural question here is whether taking one route or the other makes a
difference. It does, and this is where the next question becomes relevant.
3) Does one prioritize the inequalities due to unequal skills or
the inequalities of tax treatment between equally-skilled individu-
als?
Compare the properties of mi (w˜, zi) and mi (wi, zi) + wi ˜`. The former
always considers that an individual on a dominated indifference curve is
worse-off, and therefore gives clear priority to the compensation goal of elim-
inating inequalities due to skills. In contrast, as explained in section 5, it
applies the pairwise laissez-faire objective (i.e., seek equal lump-sum trans-
fers) to individuals with equal skills only when their wage rate coincides with
w˜. The laissez-faire objective is then less prominent.
In contrast, the latter index produces parallel budget lines for individuals
with the same wage rate, and therefore seeks to make the implicit bud-
gets equal for such individuals. When redistribution is made by lump-sum
transfers in the first-best context, it then dutifully gives the same lump-sum
transfers to individuals with the same wage rate. In the second-best context,
it seeks to obtain a similar pattern for the implicit budgets. But inequalities
due to unequal skills are less of a priority for this index. Because individuals
with the same preferences may have implicit budgets that cross (when their
wage rates differ), their ranking according to the mi (wi, zi) +wi ˜` index may
not always coincide with the ranking of their indifference curves. This is
illustrated in Figure 4. Coincidence is guaranteed only for individuals who
have a strong preference (of an almost Leontief sort) for working exactly ˜`
hours (or in the generalization using a reference preference relation, only for
individuals with personal preferences identical to the reference preferences).
This shows that the choice between mi (w˜, zi) and mi (wi, zi) + wi ˜` is a
choice between compensating unequal skills and laissez-faire among individ-
uals with identical skills: pairwise compensation versus pairwise laissez-faire.
29The reference ˜` corresponds to the case in which the reference preferences always
choose a labor time equal to ˜` whatever the actual productivity wi.
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Figure 4: Uj(zj) > Uk(zk) whereas mk (wk, zk) + wk ˜`> mj (wj, zj) + wj ˜`.
And, as explained in the previous question, when ˜`→ 0, the mi (wi, zi) +wi ˜`
leans toward laissez-faire tout court.
4) Does one want to pay special attention to the individuals
with high or low aversion to work?
When one gives priority to inequalities in skills and wage rates, one cannot
apply the laissez-faire principle to a great extent. One virtue of the laissez-
faire principle is that it is neutral with respect to individual preferences. In
a group of agents with identical skills, it seeks to give them the same implicit
budget, disregarding their preferences.
Such neutrality is necessarily lost, then, when one focuses on eliminating
inequalities due to skills, i.e., on the compensation objective. That this is
logically necessary has been well established in the literature. It is due to the
fact that one cannot at the same time give the same budget to individuals
having identical wage rates and give bundles on the same indifference curves
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to individuals with identical preferences.30
When neutrality is lost, one has to decide what preferences to favor. This
is where the choice of the parameter w˜ in mi (w˜, zi) plays a role. With
a low value for w˜, individuals who are more averse to work tend to obtain
lower implicit budgets than individuals who are less averse. And the contrary
occurs with a high value for w˜. This is illustrated in Figure 5. Therefore, with
a social ordering function displaying a strong degree of inequality aversion,
the work averse individuals are better treated under a low w˜ than under a
high w˜. If one considers for instance that work aversion in this model may
be partly due to low job quality for the unskilled, a feature that is not well
captured by this simple model, it may be prudent, or charitable, to choose a
low value for w˜.
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Figure 5: mj (w˜, zj) > mk (w˜, zk) whereas mk (w˜
′, zk) > mj (w˜′, zj).
Two additional considerations suggest that the choice of w˜ = wmin is
30For details, see Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996, 2005).
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worth considering seriously. First, it is endogenous to the wage distribution,
and implies that w˜ is the common wage when all individuals have the same
wage rate, which itself entails that the laissez-faire is an optimal allocation in
this case. Second, and more specifically, it is the only value in the [wmin, wmax]
interval that guarantees that redistribution will never violate the participa-
tion constraint (this constraint stipulates that every i should never prefer
the (0, 0) bundle to his assigned labor-consumption bundle).31 One could of
course add a participation constraint to the search for the optimal tax, but
it seems preferable to make sure that the social objective itself guarantees
that it will be satisfied by the optimal redistribution, whether in the first or
in the second best context.32
This section has shown that, even restricting attention to the class of
indexes of the form
mi (w˜i, zi) + w˜i ˜`,
there is a large spectrum of possibilities. This calls for two remarks. First,
only a small subset of all the possible utility representations of given prefer-
ences are justified from a normative point of view. The properties discussed
in this section provide a guide to the relevant ethical choices.
Second, one may think that all second-best efficient allocations may turn
out to be justified by some appropriate choice of w˜i and ˜`. This is definitely
wrong, because at the laissez-faire allocation, the worst-off for any of the
social orderings in the class considered here include agents with the lowest
wage rate wmin. Therefore, an allocation that penalizes all of the unskilled,
compared to the laissez-faire, can never be socially optimal for any of these
orderings. We conjecture that many other restrictions could be found.
We close this section with a remark about a general impossibility to
write the indexes discussed here as functions of a unique parameter gath-
ering the preferences and skill heterogeneities. Let us consider, for instance,
the reference-wage egalitarian-equivalent social ordering. Let us assume that
preferences are quasi-linear and can be represented by the following utility
function: Ui(`i, ci) = ci − v
(
`i
θi
)
, for some increasing and convex v function
satisfying v(0) = 0. Let `∗(θi) be the optimal labor time of agent i if her
wage rate were the reference w˜. The quasi-linearity assumption precisely
guarantees that it is fixed and only depends on θi (once the common v is
31See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996).
32See Fleurbaey (2008) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011a) for further discussion of
the choice of w˜ = wmin.
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given). Then the index mi (w˜, zi) boils down to
ci − v
(
yi
wiθi
)
− w˜`∗(θi) + v
(
`∗(θi)
θi
)
.
It is transparent that this utility index cannot be written as a function of the
wiθi products only. This means that optimal tax problems cannot be solved
by the Brett and Weymark (2003) method in general.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the contribution that notions of fairness
can make to optimal taxation theory. Recent interest in fairness principles
capturing the relevant differences between deserved and undeserved income
as well as between circumstances and effort, the importance of laissez-faire,
the problems with tagging, makes it timely to connect public economics with
the theory of fair allocation, which provides useful concepts.
While some authors have argued for a radical overhaul of taxation the-
ory that would throw the welfare economics baby with the utilitarian bath
water, we have pleaded for going beyond the old utilitarian criterion while
retaining the social welfare function and its arguments, the utility functions.
Specifically, we have shown that the individual utility indexes are malleable
tools which can incorporate many of the fairness considerations listed in the
previous paragraph. Perhaps the current weariness with the social welfare
function comes from an exclusive focus on weighted variants of the utilitarian
criterion. The utility-weighting approach, indeed, is quite limited and cannot
offer much because the weights cannot be transparently connected to fair-
ness ideas. Even the method of weighting incomes directly, as proposed by
Saez and Stantcheva (2013), cannot always be applied easily because even
identifying the levels of income that deserve a positive weight may some-
times require a detour by a suitably defined social welfare function involving
appropriate utility indexes.
We hope that the last section will help optimal tax theorists and applied
analysts to incorporate the relevant fairness considerations of their choice
easily, via a suitable choice of the utility indexes.
The analysis has been focused in this paper on the standard income tax
model, and one could consider many possible enrichments of this model.
Some of such enrichments (e.g., the addition of public goods, personal needs,
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or heterogenous households) would require rethinking the translation of fair-
ness principles into utility indexes. The methodology laid out in this paper,
hopefully, will be applicable to a wide set of contexts. Other taxation prob-
lems such as capital income taxation, commodity taxation, and Pigouvian
taxation can be considered as well.33
Such extensions can also serve to address the worry that the preferences
over labor and consumption that play an important role in the standard
model and in usual applications of optimal tax theory may be influenced
by factors for which the laissez-faire principle is not justified. Some workers
may be more averse to work than others because they only have access to less
pleasant or more dangerous jobs, or because they have children or relatives
needing their care at home, or because their health reduces their ability to
do certain tasks. As noted in the previous section, the worry that greater
work aversion may be explained by disadvantages can partly be addressed
by answering the fourth question in the previous section in a particular way,
by selecting a low reference wage rate in the construction of the utility in-
dex. However, addressing these issues completely and satisfactorily requires
adding the relevant features into the model, and, for applications, finding es-
timates of the distribution of characteristics in the relevant population. This
is an exciting field for research.
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